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Abstract 
We investigate the change in the effect of market structure on planned hospital quality for three 
high-volume treatments, using a quasi difference in differences approach based on the relaxation of 
patient constraints on hospital choice in England. We employ control functions to allow for time-
varying endogeneity from unobserved patient characteristics. We find that the choice reforms 
reduced quality for hip and knee replacement but not for coronary bypass. This is likely due to 
hospitals making a larger loss on hip and knee replacements, since robustness checks rule out 
changes in length of stay, new competitors ?ĞŶƚƌǇ and hospital-level mortality as possible 
confounders. 
 
JEL Nos: H51, I11, I18, L32, L33. 
Keywords: competition, quality, hospital, choice, endogeneity, difference in difference, control 
function.  
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1 Introduction 
Policy makers in many countries have attempted to increase competition amongst hospitals (EXPH, 
2015; OECD, 2012). In systems with low or zero patient co-payments, hospitals facing regulated 
prices per patient can attract patients only by improving quality. In these circumstances it is argued 
that increasing competition amongst hospitals will lead to higher quality.  
 
Theory predicts that greater competition increases quality when hospitals are profit maximisers, 
face regulated prices and constant marginal costs (Gaynor, 2006), and the price exceeds the cost of 
the marginal patient. But predictions are ambiguous when additional features of the hospital sector 
and the institutional context are taken into account (Katz, 2013). Hospitals in publicly funded 
systems may face constraints on capacity resulting in an increasing marginal cost of treatment. 
Public and non-profit hospitals may have altruistic motives and a limited ability to appropriate 
profits. These may lead them to treat patients whose marginal cost exceeds the regulated price and 
to respond to competition policies, which make demand more responsive to quality, by reducing 
quality (Brekke et al., 2011, 2014). 
 
In this study, we use a natural experiment to investigate the effect of increased competition on 
quality. Prior to 2006 patients in the English National Health Service (NHS) had their choice of 
hospital limited to those with which their local health authority had a contract. In 2006, patients 
were given the right to be offered a choice of at least four hospitals and this was later extended to 
the right to choose any qualified provider. We use a quasi difference in differences strategy to 
investigate whether the relaxation of constraints on patient choice, led to larger changes in quality 
for hospitals with more rivals. We measure hospital quality by whether a patient has an emergency 
hospital readmission within 28 days of discharge after their index treatment. 
 
We make six main contributions. First, we test whether the 2006 patient choice reform had greater 
effects on hospital quality for planned patients (i.e. non-emergency patients), whereas the bulk of 
the literature has examined quality for emergency patients (e.g. Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et 
al. (2013)). Second, we consider three large-volume planned surgical procedures: hip replacement, 
knee replacement, and coronary artery bypass grafts (CABG). CABGs belong to a different clinical 
specialty from hip and knee replacements and are provided by far fewer hospitals. This enables us to 
investigate the heterogeneity of the effects of the choice reforms across specialties and procedures.1 
Third, we use two control function strategies (Terza et al., 2008; Wooldridge, 2015) to allow for self-
selection bias arising if unobserved morbidity affects patient choice of hospital. Fourth, we 
investigate if results are sensitive to whether we measure hospital competition across all planned 
care specialties (as in much of the previous literature), the clinical speciality to which the procedure 
belongs, or the specific procedure. Fifth, we investigate if our results are affected by confounding 
factors such as length of stay, entry of new competitors, or hospital-level mortality. Finally, as our 
theory model suggests that hospitals will be less willing to improve quality to attract patients when 
they make a loss on the procedure, we investigate the profitability of the three procedures. 
 
We find evidence of time varying self-selection into hospitals. The absolute effects of the choice 
reforms are larger for all three procedures when we use our control function strategies to allow for 
this. For hip and knee replacement patients the change in the effect of market structure due to the 
2006 choice reforms was to reduce quality. We estimate that the choice reform increased 
emergency readmissions by 0.57% for hip replacement, compared to the baseline risk of 5.72%, and 
by 0.30% for knee replacement patients, compared the baseline risk of 1.9%. For planned CABG 
patients we find no effect of the choice reform on the quality of care (whether measured by 
emergency readmission or mortality). 
                                               
1 As we note in section 2.3, much of the previous literature has focused on AMI (acute myocardial infarction).  
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The results are robust to the competition measure, and to allowing for hospital mortality, length of 
stay, competition from private hospitals, and selection of patients into private hospitals. 
 
Theory models suggest that a key factor influencing the effect of competition on quality is whether 
the hospital makes a profit on the marginal patients who would be attracted by an increase in 
quality. Thus, the apparently counter-intuitive negative effect of the choice reforms on hip and knee 
replacement quality may be explained by our calculations, which suggest that hospitals were making 
a larger loss on hip and knee replacements, where we find a reduction in quality, than on CABG 
treatments where we find no effect on quality. 
 
In Section 2, we describe the institutional settings of the English NHS and summarise previous 
literature. In Section 3, we sketch a theoretical model to guide the interpretation of our results. In 
Sections 4 and 5 we explain the methods used in the empirical analysis and describe the data. 
Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the results and their 
relationship with those from other studies of hospital competition and quality. 
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2 Background 
2.1 English National Health Service 
NHS hospital treatment is tax funded and there are no charges to patients. Patients can only access 
planned hospital care by a referral from their general practitioner (GP). Most hospital care for NHS 
patients is provided by public hospitals (NHS Trusts), which are public bodies subject to financial and 
regulatory control and expected to break even. NHS Trusts vary in size, number of sites, whether 
they are teaching hospitals, and in the mix of emergency and planned services provided. 
 
A series of changes in the market for NHS funded hospital care were introduced during our study 
period (2002-2011) with the intention of stimulating competition to improve quality (Department of 
Health, 2000; 2002) and to reduce waiting times for hospital care. 
 
During the study period, local health authorities (Primary Care Trusts: PCTs) held budgets from the 
Department of Health to purchase hospital care for their populations. Before 2003/4, PCTs mainly 
placed block contracts with local healthcare providers: the provider received a lump sum from the 
PCT for agreeing to treat all patients belonging to the PCT who were referred to that hospital. GPs 
could in principle refer to any NHS provider, with an out of area tariff being charged if the provider 
was not in contract with the PCT in which the patient was resident. 
 
Between 2003/4 and 2008/9 prospective payment per patient treated was rolled out, with the 
proportion of treatments covered increasing over time. The prospective pricing system is based on 
Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) which are groupings of hospital services of similar costs and 
type and are the English analogue of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). The tariff is based on the 
average of HRG costs over all hospitals in the two previous years, with an allowance for geographic 
variation in input prices (Monitor, 2013; 'ƌĂƓŝē et al., 2015). 
 
Financial penalties for emergency readmissions following planned procedures were introduced in 
the NHS in 2011 (Kristensen, 2017). They will not however have affected provider incentives in our 
study period (2002/3 to 2010/11). 
 
Until 2003/4, very few NHS funded patients were treated in private sector hospitals. From 2003/4 
privately owned Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) specialising in the provision of a 
limited set of planned treatments, including hip and knee replacement but not CABG, were 
encouraged to locate in areas where NHS patients were experiencing long waiting times 
(Department of Health, 2004; Department of Health, 2006). They received favourable five-year 
contracts with revenue, which did not vary with the number of patients treated (Naylor and Gregory, 
2009). From 2008 onwards other private providers were also allowed to treat NHS funded patients 
and all treatments. These non-ISTC private providers were paid the same DRG tariff as NHS 
providers. As initial ISTC contracts expired, ISTCs were also paid based on the national DRG tariff 
from 2009 onwards. 
 
Until 2006, the amount of choice for planned care varied across PCTs and general practices, 
ĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞƐĞƚŽĨŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞWdŚĂĚƉůĂĐĞĚďůŽĐŬĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐĂŶĚ'WƐ ?
willingness to refer outside this set. From 2006/7, planned patients had to be offered a choice of at 
least four hospitals by their GPs and from 2008/9 they could choose any qualified provider, whether 
NHS or private. 
 
The numbers of NHS patients treated in the private sector increased rapidly from 2008/9 (Arora et 
al., 2013). By 2010/11, the independent sector treated around 4% of all NHS planned patients 
(Hawkes 2012), including 7.1% of hip replacement patients and 7.3% of knee replacement patients. 
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To complement the choice reform, an electronic booking service for outpatient appointments was 
rolled out from 2005 to help each patient and their GP make a firm booking during a consultation 
(Dusheiko and Gravelle, 2015). In 2007, the NHS Choices website was established to provide public 
information on all providers of NHS services. 
 
These policies led to changes in demand patterns and increased hospital elasticity of demand with 
respect to quality (Gaynor et al., 2016; Moscelli et al., 2016). 
 
2.2 The market for planned hip and knee replacement and coronary artery bypass 
Hip and knee replacement are orthopaedic treatments for osteoarthritis health problems, while 
CABG is a cardiovascular surgery used for some circulatory system diseases. In the English NHS, all 
three are publicly funded high-volume planned procedures, with a yearly average of about 10,000 
first time CABG treatments and over 45,000 primary for both hip and knee replacement. 
 
The supply sides of the markets for these planned treatments differ. In the period covered by our 
sample, NHS-funded hip (knee) replacement surgery was offered in 232 (238) NHS sites and 47 (52) 
private hospital sites, while NHS-funded CABG surgery was performed only in about 47 hospital sites 
and not in private providers. Privately funded planned CABG patients treated by private hospitals 
accounted for 4.87% of all CABG patients in England (NICOR, 2012). In 2010/11, 11% of the overall 
sum of all planned hip and knee replacements were privately funded (Arora et al., 2013). 
 
2.3 Previous literature 
The empirical literature on hospital competition and quality has mainly focused on quality for 
emergency conditions, in particular acute myocardial infarction (AMI). This approach has the 
advantage that it reduces possible bias from selection of hospitals by patients with different 
unobserved morbidity since emergency patients are unlikely to be choosing their hospital. However, 
it relies on the assumption that quality for emergency patients is strongly correlated with quality, 
and therefore demand, from planned patients (Bloom et al., 2015). Results from this literature are 
mixed, with some studies finding that increased competition increases quality (Kessler and 
McClellan, 2000; Kessler and Geppert, 2005; Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013; Colla et al., 
2014; Bloom et al., 2015) and others, that it has no effect (Mukamel et al, 2001) or reduces quality 
(Shen, 2003; Propper et al., 2004; Propper et al., 2008), or has effects which vary across the type of 
emergency condition (Moscelli et al., 2018b). 
 
There are fewer studies of competition for planned care. Colla et al. (2014), relying on observables 
to allow for case-mix differences across hospitals, find that competition had no effect on 30-day 
emergency readmission rates for Medicare hip and knee replacement patients and reduced quality 
for dementia patients. Wilson (2016) uses a control function with distance as an instrumental 
variable to control for unobserved selection amongst haemodialysis patients in Atlanta. Quality at a 
provider is lower the greater the proportion of nearby providers who are affiliated with the provider. 
In a cross-section study of English hip replacement patients, Feng et al. (2015) measures quality 
using rich data on patient reported outcomes and find that increased competition has a positive but 
statistically insignificant association with quality. Cooper et al. (2018) find that the opening of a 
private hospital near an NHS hospital led to a reduction in its pre-operative length of stay for hip and 
knee replacement patients, and left the NHS provider to treat sicker patients who had longer post-
operative length of stay. Using data from 2009 to 2012, Skellern (2017) finds that market structure 
has a negative effect on patient reported outcomes for hip and knee replacement, groin hernia, and 
varicose veins, but the effect is insignificant when hospital-level fixed effects are included. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
The theory literature has provided a number of models which identify the conditions under which 
competition can increase or reduce quality even when producers face fixed prices: see, for example, 
Gaynor (2006), Brekke et al. (2011), and Katz (2013). Here we sketch a very simple model which 
shows how the effect of competition on quality depends on the cost function and the degree of 
provider altruism. 
 
A hospital chooses quality q to maximise  
 
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( , )v q B q pD q C D q q B q qT T T S T         (1) 
 
where B(q) (Bq > 0) captures intrinsic motivation or altruistic preferences (McGuire, 2000). p is the 
fixed price of the treatment. Hospital demand ( , )D q T  is increasing in quality ( ( , )qD q T  > 0). T  is a 
parameter (such as policy towards patient choice, or information about quality) which increases the 
responsiveness of demand to quality ( 0qD T ! ) and can therefore be interpreted as a measure 
promoting competition. C(.) is the cost function, which is increasing in both volume of patients 
treated and quality. The first order condition when the hospital chooses a positive level of quality is 
 
  ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ( , )) ( , ) ( ( , ), ) 0q q q q D q qv q B q q B q p C D q D q C D q qT S T T T Tª º       ¬ ¼  (2) 
 
and we assume that vqq < 0. 
 
Using the implicit function theorem, the effect of a change in the competition policy parameter T  
on quality q(ɽ ? ?) is 
 
( ( ), ) ( ) ( )
( ( ), ) ( ) ( 2 )
q D q DD qD
qq qq D qq DD q Dq q qq
v q p C D C C D
q
v q B p C D C D C D C
T T T
T
T T
T T
            (3) 
 
The second term in the numerator depends on whether there are economies or diseconomies of 
scale (CDD < 0 or CDD > 0), whether an increase in quality increases or reduces the marginal cost of 
output (CDq > 0 or CDq < 0), and whether an increase in ș increases or reduces demand (Dș > 0 or Dș < 
0). Since Dqș > 0 the sign of the first term in the numerator depends on whether marginal profit (p  W 
CD) on additional patients is positive or negative. If price exceeds marginal cost then an increase in ș 
is more likely to increase quality. But the first order condition (2) implies that that the hospital will 
choose q so that  p  W CD = (Cq  Bq)/Dq and so a sufficiently altruistic hospital will increase quality to 
point where the marginal profit on patients attracted by higher quality is negative. An increase in ș is 
then more likely to reduce quality. More elaborate specifications, in which demand also depends on 
the qualities of rival providers, will have more complicated comparative static properties, but the 
effect of competition policy changes, which increase the responsiveness of demand to provider 
quality will still depend, inter alia, on the relationship between the regulated price and marginal 
cost. 
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4 Methods 
4.1 Model specification 
We measure quality as the patient having an emergency readmission within 28 days of their 
discharge from hospital after a planned procedure for hip replacement, knee replacement, or CABG. 
For CABG patients we also measure quality as the patient dying in or outside hospital within 30 days 
of admission for a CABG procedure (see Section 5.1). 
 
We estimate linear probability models (LPM) 
 
1 2iht t iht h t ht h it htq M AE J P H Hc c      x ȥ [ ȥ           (4) 
 
where qiht is equal to 1 if patient  i  treated in NHS site h in year t (t =  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?2 had an 
emergency readmission within 28 days of hospital admission and zero otherwise; Et  is a year effect 
and xiht is a vector of patient covariates; hM  is market structure, measured as the equivalent 
number of rivals (see section 5.2), facing site h averaged across the years 2002/3 to 2005/6 before 
the relaxation of constraints on patient choice; At is the choice policy indicator, being equal to 0 in 
the four pre-choice reform years (2002/3 to 2005/6) and to 1 in the five post-reform years (2006/7 
to 2010/11);  xht is a vector of hospital site time-varying covariates. Ph is a time-invariant hospital site 
effect; ɸit is the effect of unobserved patient characteristics and ɸht is the effect of unobserved time-
varying hospital characteristics. 
 
Equation (4) describes a quasi difference in difference strategy (Card, 1992). The parameter of 
interest, ɶ, is identified through differences in treatment intensity: the change in the effect of market 
structure after the relaxation of constraints on patient choice in 2006, rather than through the 
assignment to a defined treatment or control group (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Since there can be 
no change in the incentive for quality from lifting restrictions on patient choice for a provider with 
no rivals, the effect of the 2006 choice reform on quality for a provider with hM  rivals is given by ɶ
hM : the policy reform pivots the quality function about its intercept on the quality axis in (q, hM ) 
space. Thus, the sign of ɶconveys useful policy information: whether the 2006 choice reform 
increased or reduced readmission or mortality, and ɶ hM  is the magnitude of this effect for hospital 
h.  As in other difference in differences regressions, ɶ is the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) 
effect (Blundell and Costa-Diaz, 2009). 
 
We estimate Eq. (4) with hospital site fixed effects ʅh to control for unobserved time-invariant 
provider heterogeneity. Year dummies control for time-varying factors, including other policy 
changes, such as the phased introduction of prospective pricing, and technical progress. We use a 
rich set of patient characteristics to control for severity (see Section 5.1). 
 
There are several advantages of estimating LPMs in this context. First, we can interpret the 
estimated coefficients as marginal effects and obtain unbiased estimates of ɶ, because the LPM 
approximates the conditional expectation function, whether the latter is linear or non-linear 
(Angrist, 2001; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Second, a LPM yields unbiased estimates when fixed 
effects are included, unlike nonlinear estimators for modelling limited dependent variables 
(Lancaster, 2000; Greene, 2004). In our study, such problems would be exacerbated by the 
skewed distribution of the outcome variables. Third, unlike probit or logit estimators an LPM 
is not subject to bias if there is measurement error in the dependent variable (Hausman, 2001). 
                                               
2 Data is for financial years 1 April to 31 March. 
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Fourth, the estimation of causal effects is found to be generally consistent when using instrumental 
variable strategies with a linear first and second stage, but not necessarily when the second stage is 
a nonlinear model like probit or logit, especially when the outcome variable is very rare (Basu et al., 
2018). In our study, we control for endogenous patient choice (see subsection 4.3) with two control 
function strategies. One is akin to the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. The other differs 
from 2SLS because it requires an additional restriction on the conditional mean. The use of an LPM 
in the second stage equation also allows a comparison between the two control function strategies, 
which would not be possible with logit or probit outcome equations. 
 
4.2 Endogenous market structure 
There are two main threats to identification of the change in the effects of market structure after 
the choice reform of 2006. The first is the endogeneity of market structure. Our preferred measure 
of market structure is based on the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI): the sum of the square of 
provider market shares. Since observed market shares may depend on provider quality, we follow 
the standard practice (Kessler and McClellan, 2000) of computing the HHI using predicted market 
shares from a model in which patient choice of provider depends on distance and other covariates 
but does not depend on quality (see Section 5.2). But using predicted HHI does not eliminate 
another source of potential endogeneity of market structure: new providers may choose to locate 
near poor quality incumbents. Hence we follow Gaynor et al. (2013) and use a measure of pre-choice 
time-invariant market structure (i.e. hM  the average of the market structure measure in the pre-
policy period) that is not affected by endogenous entry and exit decisions. 
 
The main source of changes in market structure over the period 2002/3 to 2010/11 was, from 
2003/4, the entry of ISTCs specialising in a small number of treatments, including hip and knee and 
replacements, and, from 2008/9, the entry of private hospitals which had previously only treated 
private patients. ISTCs were encouraged to locate in areas where NHS patients were experiencing 
long waiting times (Department of Health, 2004; Department of Health, 2006). Cooper et al. (2018) 
found that, whilst ISTC entry was more likely where existing NHS providers had longer waiting times, 
it was not associated with changes in length of stay or quality. The private providers who started 
treating NHS patients from 2008/9 onwards were already providing care to private patients. Thus 
endogenous private sector entry may not be a problem even if we measure market structure at 
treatment level.3  
 
4.3 Endogenous patient selection of hospital 
The second potential identification problem is that unobservable patient morbidity ɸit, which will 
affect the probability of readmission or mortality qiht, may also affect patient choice of provider and 
bias the estimates of effects of market structure on hospital quality (Gowrisankaran and Town, 1999; 
Geweke et al., 2003). We can write the outcome regression (Eq. 4) as 
 
1 iht t iht ht it htq qE H Hc    x ȥ        (5) 
 
Where 
 
  2x ȥht h t ht hq M AJ Pc          (6) 
                                               
3 If pressure on management to improve quality is driven by overall planned competition, as in Bloom et al. (2015), then the 
fact that private providers ? NHS-funded activity accounted for only 4% of all planned NHS treatments (Hawkes, 2012) even 
at the end of our period also suggests that endogeneity may not be an important problem if market structure is measured 
at the level of all planned admissions, as in one of our specifications. 
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is hospital h quality in year t (its contribution to patient outcome qiht). Estimation of (4) will yield 
biased estimates of J, M2 and Ph if [ ]itE hH A? ?, i.e. if unobserved patient morbidity differs 
systematically across hospitals, because  
 
       cov( , )ht itq H = cov( , ) cov( , [ ])ht it ht itE q h E q h E hH Hª º  ª º¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ cov( , [ ])ht itq E hH .    (7) 
 
&ƌŽŵĂǇĞƐ ?ZƵůĞ4 
 
[ ]itE hH ( , , ) ( )( , , ) ( )
tit ht
it it it
t
it ht it it
P q f d
P q f d
HH H H
H H H
ª º« » « »« »¬ ¼
³ ³    (8) 
 
where P(Hit, qht, ) = Pr ith Hª º¬ ¼ = Piht is the probability that patient i in year t chooses hospital 
h and f t(Hit) is the density function for unobserved patient morbidity in year t. Sufficient 
conditions for Hcov( , )ht itq A? ?are that unobserved patient morbidity affects which hospital is 
chosen (wP(Hit,qht)/wHit A? ? ?, otherwise [ ]itE hH = [ ]itE H , and that the effect of unobserved 
patient morbidity on the probability of choosing provider h varies with provider quality 
(wP2(Hit, qht) / wqht wHit A? ? ? ?
 
If the effect of unobserved morbidity on choice of hospital is time-invariant, then the estimates of ɶ 
will be unbiased, thanks to the inclusion of hospital fixed effects Ph. But, otherwise, we need to 
control for selection. We do so in two ways. First, we use a rich set of patient characteristics, 
including comorbidities and past emergency hospital admissions, to control for selection on 
observables and, to the extent that observable and unobservable morbidity are correlated, to 
remove some selection on the unobservables. Second, we use two control function strategies 
(Wooldridge, 2015) to tackle any remaining selection on unobservables. Both strategies are based on 
estimating models for patient choice of provider as a function of variables, such as patient distance 
to provider, which are uncorrelated with provider quality as in, for example, Gowrisankaran and 
Town (1999) and Wilson (2016). 
 
In the first strategy, we estimate for each provider h and each year t a linear probability model 
 
2 3
1 2 3 4 5iht ht ht ih ht ih ht ih ht ih ihtC d d d nearest rD D D D D          (9) 
 
where Ciht = 1 if patient i chooses hospital h in year t and zero otherwise, dih is the distance from the 
centroid of patient i ?Ɛ Lower Super Output Area (LSOA)5 of residence to provider h, and nearestih is 
an indicator for h being the nearest provider to patient i.6  We then estimate the second stage 
quality model as 
 
1 2 3ÖLPMiht t iht h t ht ih h it htq M AE J P H Hc c       x ȥ [ ȥ U 
ȥ     (10) 
                                               
4  > @ > @ > @ > @Pr Pr / Pr Pr Pr / Prit it it ith h h h hH H H Hª º    ª º¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ . 
5 In the period 2002 to 2010 there were 32,482 LSOAs with an average populations of around 1500. 
6 Since Eq. (9) is estimated separately for each year and for each hospital, it cannot contain time invariant hospital 
characteristics such as teaching hospital status. 
Effects of market structure and patient choice on hospital quality for planned patients  9 
 
where 1 2Ö Ö Ö Ö[ , ,..., ]LPM LPM LPM LPMit i t i t iHtr r r r  and  ÖLPMihtr = Öiht ihtC C  are the residuals from the linear first 
stage regressions Eq. (9). With linear first and second stage models this control function procedure 
of residual inclusion (2SRI) is akin to two stage least squares (2SLS), but with the advantage that a 
joint test on the significance of the residuals can be used to test for endogeneity of choice of 
provider (Terza et al., 2008; Wooldridge, 2010). This estimation strategy (Linear 2SRI) is fully 
nonparametric. 
 
In the second strategy, we estimate a first stage conditional logit model for patient choice of 
hospital. We assume that the random utility obtained by patient i from provider h in year t is 
 
  
2 3
1 2 3 4 5 5iht iht iht t ih t ih t ih t ht t ht t ht ihtU V d d d T F PO[ T T T T T T [           (11) 
 
where Tht, Fht and POht are indicators for teaching, foundation trust and privately-owned hospital 
status. We assume that the patient choice set Si is the closest 50 providers (accounting for over 99% 
of choices in each year). If the ʇiht are i.i.d with an extreme value distribution then the probability 
that patient i chooses provider h in year t is (McFadden, 1974) 
 
    1exp exp( )
i
iht iht ih th S
P V V

cc
ª º ¬ ¼¦       (12) 
 
Estimation of the conditional logit model yields residuals ÖÖCLMiht iht ihtr C P  , which we then include 
in the second stage outcome regression.7 This strategy (CL 2SRI) is semi-parametric, as it is 
characterised by the structural parametric estimation of the first stage conditional logit model, 
followed by the nonparametric estimation of the linear probability model for the outcome 
regression. Compared to Linear 2SRI, the identification of the parameter(s) of interest in the quality 
outcome model when using the CL 2SRI strategy rests on the slightly stronger assumption that 
( | , ( ))E gH [  x > @ Ö| ( ) ( | ) 0CLME g E rH [ H   (Blundell and Powell, 2003). Given the linearity of 
our final outcome equation and the multinomial nature of the endogenous hospital choice, the 
estimation of Eq. (10) with a CL 2SRI correction is less likely to produce biased estimates of the effect 
of interest (J) that than with fully parametric 2SRI strategies with nonlinear second stages and a 
binary endogenous treatment (Basu et al., 2018). 
 
In both control function strategies the residuals pick up the effect of unobserved patient morbidity 
H ih  on the choice of hospital h, and so they control for bias due to the endogenous patient selection 
of hospital. The strategies are complements. The CL 2SRI strategy has a more plausible first stage 
specification, which should predict hospital choice more accurately and hence produce more 
efficient estimates of J (Newey and McFadden, 1994). If the two CF strategies produce similar 
parameter estimates this is reassuring since Linear 2SRI estimation of J  is expected to be unbiased 
(Basu et al., 2018). 
 
Our control function strategies use distances from a ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŽŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐĂƐŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂů
variables (IVs), i.e. source of exogenous variation to control for endogenous patient choice of 
hospital. The use of distances as IVs has been common in the healthcare literature since McClellan et 
al. (1994) and Newhouse and McClellan (1998). Many studies show that distance is highly relevant in 
predicting hospital choice (for examples for England, see Gaynor et al., 2016; Gutacker et al., 2016; 
                                               
7 For hospitals not in the nearest 50 we set the residual to 1 unless the patient chose a hospital not in the nearest 50 (1% of 
patients) in which case we set the residual to 0 for the hospital chosen and to 1 for all other hospitals outside the nearest 
50. 
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Moscelli et al., 2016). With respect to the exogeneity requirement for an IV, Gowrisankaran and 
Town (1999) note that whilst the distance to the chosen hospital may be correlated with illness 
severity, the distances from a ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŽall the hospitals available for treatment will not. 8  
 
4.4 Sample selection  
We estimate our models on the effect of the choice reforms with a sample of patients treated in 
NHS hospitals. The main source of changes in market structure over the period 2002/3 to 2010/11 
was the entry of ISTCs and (from 2008) private hospital sites. Until 2009, ISTCs were not paid per 
patient treated (Naylor and Gregory, 2009) and were only moved onto DRG pricing per patient 
treated as their long term contracts expired. Hence, ISTCs had little incentive to compete on quality 
for most of our period and so including NHS-funded patients treated in ISTCs could bias the estimate 
of J  towards zero. Nor can we include patients treated in other private providers since they were 
only available for NHS patients from 2008 onwards, so that it not possible to compute a time-
invariant market structure measure for them. Hence we estimate the effect of the choice reforms 
for patients treated in NHS hospitals only. But we know that NHS patients treated in NHS providers 
were unobservedly more morbid than those treated in the private sector (Moscelli et al., 2018c) so 
that there is a risk of sample selection bias, in addition to unobserved selection of patients into 
individual NHS hospitals. 
 
To test for possible sample selection bias in the estimate of the effect of the choice reform on 
patients treated in NHS hospital we augment our baseline model with a Heckman selection 
correction term (inverse Mills ratio) from an additional first stage model for choice of NHS rather 
than private hospital (Heckman, 1979). Rather than relying on non-linearities for identification, we 
estimate a first stage probit model for choice of NHS provider in which the latent utility from NHS 
treatment is 
 
  
*
0 1 2( )it t t itNHS itISP it t itNHS d d uU U c    x ȡ       (13) 
 
where itNHSd and itISPd are the distances to the closest NHS hospital site and to the closest private 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐŝƚĞƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?and the patient chooses the NHS provider if and 
only if 
*
itNHS  A? ?. As with the use of distance in the first stage choice models we assume, plausibly, 
that differential distance itNHS itISPd d  satisfies the exclusion restriction. 
 
4.5 Inference  
In all models the standard errors are bootstrapped (with 1,000 replications) to account for the 
sampling error resulting from the inclusion of the imputed regressors Öhtr  (Murphy and Topel, 1985). 
We report t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors with clustering at hospital site level, to 
account for the within-cluster error correlation between hospital quality and the change in the effect 
of market structure (Cameron and Miller, 2015; Moulton, 1990). 
 
 
                                               
8 There is no evidence of residential sorting for planned hospital care in England. It is possible that patients in need of 
repeated treatments, like haemodialysis or chemotherapy, are more likely to locate closer to hospitals to minimize travel. 
But patients are less likely to change their residence for one-off treatments like CABG or hip and knee replacement, especially 
after the reduction of hospital waits for planned treatments in England from 2005 onwards (Propper et al., 2010). 
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5 Data 
Our main data source is the Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) database. HES has information on all 
admissions to NHS providers and all NHS-funded hospital admissions to private providers. We use 
data on planned hip replacement, knee replacement and coronary artery bypass (CABG) patients 
aged 35 and over (Appendix B has detailed procedure codes). 
 
5.1 Quality 
We measure quality for planned hip replacement, knee replacement, and CABG patients treated in 
NHS hospitals by whether the patient had an emergency admission within 28 days of discharge after 
their initial planned procedure. Emergency readmissions are one of the performance indicators 
included in the NHS Outcomes Framework 9 and a widely used measure of hospital quality in the 
health economics and clinical literatures (Ashton et al., 1997; Weissman et al., 1999; Balla et al., 
2008; Billings et al., 2012; Blunt et al., 2015). Since planned CABG treatment has a mortality risk of 
1.1%, which is around four times as great as for planned hip and knee replacement mortality, we 
also measure CABG quality by whether the patient died in any location (i.e. inside or outside the 
hospital) within 30 days of their index admission. Alternative quality measures based on patient 
reported outcomes were not available for hip and knee replacements before 2009, after the 2006 
choice reform, and were never collected for CABG. Emergency readmissions and mortality indicators 
are also available for almost admissions, unlike patient reported outcomes where missing data are 
more frequent and related to hospital behaviour (Gomes et al., 2016). 
 
To control for patient characteristics we use gender, age in ten-year bands, the number of co-
morbidities based on ICD10 codes, the Charlson index based on morbidities predictive of future 
mortality (Charlson et al., 1987), and the number of emergency hospitalisations in the previous year. 
We also attribute to the patient the IMD10 income deprivation, the IMD environment deprivation, 
the incapacity benefit claims rate, and the disability claims rate of their LSOA. 
 
Hospital characteristics are captured by indicators for whether a hospital is a Foundation Trust and 
hence had greater financial flexibility (Marini et al., 2008), and whether it is a teaching hospital. 
 
5.2 Market Structure 
We construct measures of market structure for NHS hospital sites providing hip replacements (232), 
knee replacements (238), and CABG (47) between 2002/3 and 2010/11. Our main measures are 
based on the Herfindhal-Hirshmann Index (HHI): the sum of the squared market shares of the 
providers in the market, whether NHS or private. We measure market structure as the reciprocal of 
the HHI, i.e. the equivalent number of rivals  the number of equal-sized firms that would yield the 
same HHI. Using actual patient flows to compute the HHI could induce reverse causality bias since 
the number of patients choosing a hospital is affected by its quality (Kessler and McClellan, 2000). 
We therefore follow the standard practice of using HHIs computed from patient flows predicted 
from a model of patient choice, which uses patient distances to hospital and hospital characteristics 
but not hospital quality (Appendix C). 
 
                                               
9 Emergency readmissions are based on the official NHS definition (HSCIC 2016) 
https://files.digital.nhs.uk/C4/E99638/Spec_03K_520ISR7G.pdf. Since our analysis is based on patients treated in NHS 
hospitals only, the emergency readmissions to a NHS hospital following a surgery in a private hospital are excluded. 
Emergency readmissions are attributed to the hospital where planned care was performed, not to the hospital that 
provided emergency care after discharge from the index planned admission.  
10 Index of Multiple Deprivation. See http://geoconvert.mimas.ac.uk/help/imd-2007-manual.pdf. 
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It is possible that quality for a procedure depends on competition in the market for that procedure 
(hip replacement, knee replacement, CABG), or in the market for the speciality (musculoskeletal, 
circulatory), or in the market for all planned admissions. We therefore compute the equivalent 
number of rivals using predicted HHIs defined by choice of provider by patients receiving the 
procedure, by all patients being treated in the speciality, and by all planned patients. As a further 
robustness check, we also use a count of the actual number of rival hospital sites within 30 
kilometres. 
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6 Results 
6.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics on NHS patients treated in NHS providers. Mean ages are 68 
for hip replacement, 70 for knee replacement and 65 years for CABG. The proportion of female 
patients is much higher for hip and knee replacement (60% and 58%) than for CABG (18%). Hip and 
knee replacement patients have an average of three co-morbidities whilst CABG patients have six. 
Hip and knee replacement patients also had fewer emergency admissions in the year prior to 
treatment than CABG. CABG patients travelled further to their provider than hip and knee 
replacement patients. 
 
Hip and knee replacements increased and then fell slightly between 2002/3-2010/11 (Appendix 
Figure A1). CABGs declined over the entire period. Risk-adjusted planned care hospital quality 
declined (i.e. 28-days standardised emergency readmissions increased) over the period (Appendix 
Figure A2), reflecting either a secular decline in provider quality or an increase in unobserved 
morbidity of admitted patients, possibly due to changes in GP referral and hospital admission 
thresholds. After the choice reform of 2006 the proportion of patients travelling further than the 
closest hospital site increased by about 15% for both hip and knee replacement procedures, while 
for CABG surgery it initially increased by 3% and later decreased by 5.6% (Appendix Figure A3). 
 
Table 2 reports correlations among risk-adjusted NHS hospital site quality measures for our three 
planned procedures. The correlations are generally small. The highest correlation (0.28) is between 
knee and hip replacement emergency readmission rates, which is perhaps to be expected since they 
are in the same speciality and may be carried out by the same surgical teams. CABG readmission and 
mortality rates are also significantly positively correlated (0.17). The correlations between the CABG 
and the hip and knee replacement quality measures are weak. 
 
Since almost all of the literature on hospital competition and quality has focused on mortality rates 
for emergency admissions for conditions such as AMI, we also report, in italics, the correlations 
between our planned care quality measures with the mortality of three high volume emergency 
conditions (AMI, hip fracture and stroke). The emergency mortality rates are very weakly associated 
with the planned care quality measures and the only significant correlation is negative. Gravelle et 
al. (2014) used a larger set of measures for 2009/10 and also found little evidence for a positive 
correlation between planned and emergency care hospital quality. These findings suggest that 
mortality for emergency conditions is not necessarily indicative of hospital quality for planned 
procedures and that the relationship between market structure and measures of quality may be 
sensitive to the quality measure used. 
 
Table 3 has summary statistics on measures of market structure. Most of the measures increased 
over the period by between 15% and 23%, with the exception of CABG market structure that was 
substantially unchanged, as we would expect since no private providers entered this market. The 
percentage increase in the actual number of NHS and private planned care providers within 30 km 
was very similar (24%) to that for the equivalent numbers (23%).11 
                                               
11 The correlations for the equivalent number of rival sites for all planned admissions with the equivalent numbers of rivals 
for the two specialties are at least 0.97 and for the three procedures are at least 0.85.  The correlation with the actual 
numbers of rivals for all planned admissions is 0.78 (Appendix Table A1). Figure A4 plots the trends in the competition 
measures. 
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Table 1. Patient descriptive statistics 
  Hip Replacement    Knee Replacement   CABG  
  Mean SD Median   Mean SD Median  Mean SD Median 
Emergency readmission within 28 days  0.057 0.232 0   0.019 0.137 0  0.041 0.198 0 
Died within 30-days (anywhere) 0.003 0.051 0   0.002 0.047 0  0.011 0.105 0 
Emergency admissions in year before treatment 0.06 0.3 0   0.06 0.29 0  0.29 0.65 0 
Age 68.27 10.75 69   70.03 9.23 71  65.37 9.16 66 
Female  0.6 0.49 1   0.58 0.49 1  0.18 0.38 0 
Number of diagnoses on admission  2.95 2.03 2   3.07 2.04 3  5.71 2.96 5 
Charlson Index: zero co-morbidities 0.79 0.41 1   0.75 0.43 1  0.57 0.5 1 
Charlson Index: one co-morbidity 0.16 0.37 0   0.19 0.4 0  0.3 0.46 0 
Charlson Index: more than one co-morbidity 0.05 0.21 0   0.05 0.22 0  0.13 0.34 0 
IMD income deprivation  0.12 0.1 0.09   0.14 0.11 0.1  0.14 0.11 0.1 
IMD living environment  18.64 14.66 14.24   19.45 15.2 14.9  20.42 15.97 15.57 
Incapacity claims 0.03 0.02 0.03   0.03 0.02 0.03  0.04 0.02 0.03 
Disability claims 0.05 0.03 0.04   0.05 0.03 0.05  0.05 0.03 0.05 
Distance to chosen hospital (km) 9.24 8 6.58   8.62 7.67 6  8.15 7.4 5.59 
Distance to A&E type 1 hospital (km) -36.74 45.56 -22.8   -35.39 44.6 -20.77          .         .         . 
Distance to closest NHS hospital site (km) 8.51 7.4 6.13   7.93 7.1 5.58          .         .         . 
Distance to closest Private hospital site (km) 45.26 45.96 31.1   43.31 45.06 28.83          .         .         . 
Length of in-hospital stay 8.21 8.76 7   8.04 8.35 6  9.15 7.08 7 
Number of patients 414,433   463,953  114,291 
Notes.  Planned patients treated in financial years 2002/3 to 2010/11 in NHS hospital sites only.  
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Table 2. Correlations of risk-adjusted hospital planned and emergency quality 
  Readmissions  Mortality 
 
 Planned 
hip  
Planned 
knee  
Planned 
CABG 
 Planned 
CABG 
Emergency 
AMI 
Emergency 
hip 
fracture 
Readmissions 
Planned 
knee  
0.2832*** 1  
 
   
Planned 
CABG 
-0.097 0.037 1 
 
   
         
Mortality 
rate 
Planned 
CABG 
-0.132* 0.068 0.172*** 
 
1   
Emergency 
AMI 
0.018 -0.060** -0.094 
 
0.203*** 1  
Emergency 
hip 
fracture 
0.025 -0.054** 0.024 
 
0.181** 0.205*** 1 
Emergency 
stroke 
0.028 -0.119*** 0.035 
 
-0.045 0.223*** 0.170*** 
Notes. Readmissions: risk-adjusted emergency readmission rate within 28 days of discharge. Mortality: risk-adjusted 
mortality rate within 30 days from index admission. NHS hospital sites, 2002/3 to 2010/11. We follow HSCIC methodology in 
risk adjusting for patient casemix (HSCIC, 2015). We estimate risk-adjusted emergency readmissions (or CABG mortality) 
based on a logit model and controlling for Charslon index co-morbidities, number of diagnosis, age groups, gender, 
interactions of age groups with gender, income deprivation at LSOA level, day of the week, month and year of admission.  * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 3.  Market structure measures 
 2002/3-2005/6 2006/7-2010/11 
  Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Equivalent number hospital sites within 30km           
       All planned admissions 3.33 2.43 1 12.99 3.93 2.64 1 13.78 
       Circulatory admissions 3.42 2.49 1 12.32 3.90 2.74 1 12.15 
       Musculoskeletal admissions 2.71 1.87 1 9.93 3.34 2.06 1 10.93 
       Hip Replacement admissions 1.60 0.78 1 4.59 1.88 0.99 1 5.50 
       Knee Replacement admissions 1.61 0.75 1 4.40 1.88 0.85 1 4.68 
       CABG admissions 2.03 1.40 1 5.04 2.00 1.44 1 4.91 
Number NHS & ISP sites within 30km 14.56 16.90 0 63 17.17 19.62 0 76 
Number ISP sites within 30km  0.14 0.42 0 2 1.66 2.11 0 12 
Notes. Equivalent number: inverse of the predicted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. ISP (NHS) hospital sites: privately (NHS) 
owned sites treating at least 100 NHS funded planned (excluding planned) patients per year. 
 
6.2 Results 
Table 4 reports the coefficient (ɶ) on the interaction between pre-2006 market structure and the 
post-2006 choice reform indicator with the market defined as the speciality (musculoskeletal or 
circulatory). We report four models: column (1) has just hospital and time fixed effects; column (2) 
adds covariates (specification Eq. (4)). Columns (3) and (4) estimate Eq. (10) by adding the first stage 
residuals from the linear probability choice model and from the first stage conditional logit (CL) 
choice models to the model in column (2). 
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Table 4.  Effect of choice reform with time-invariant pre reform specialty-based market structure 
  
FE model 
without 
covariates 
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
CL 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
a. Hip Replacement Emergency Readmission (Patients: 412,464; hospital sites: 232)   
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0020** 0.0017** 0.0020 0.0021** 
 (2.405) (2.017) (1.545) (2.149)      
     
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0   649.00 499.00 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐс ?   0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.005 0.011 0.012 0.012 
b. Knee Replacement Emergency Readmission (Patients: 461,594; hospital sites: 238)   
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0007*** 0.0005** 0.0011** 0.0011*** 
 (2.648) (2.152) (2.386) (3.897)     
     
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0   770.00 557.00 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐс ?   0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 
c. CABG Emergency Readmission (Patients: 112,844; hospital sites: 47)     
Choice Policy * Market Structure -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 
 (-0.275) (-0.417) (0.236) (-0.817)     
     
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0   251.30 75.50 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐс ?   0.0000 0.0052 
R2 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003 
d. CABG Mortality (Patients: 114,291; hospital sites: 47)       
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 
 (0.195) (-0.162) (-0.250) (-0.637)     
     
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0   270.7 176.4 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐс ?   0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.001 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient in NHS provider had emergency readmission within 28 days from discharge following 
admission, or CABG patient in NHS provider died within 30 days. Choice Policy: indicator for 2006/7 onwards.  Market 
structure: average of estimated equivalent number of rival hospital sites (= 1/(predicted HHI)) for patients in hospital 
specialty  during period 2002/3 to 2005/6. Column (1) models include only hospital and year fixed effects; Column (2) models 
as column (1) plus covariates. Column (3) augments column (2) models with the residuals for all hospitals from linear first 
stage choice model. Column (3) augments column (2) models with the residuals for all hospitals from conditional logit first 
stage choice model. Financial years: 2002/3- 2010/11. t-statistics in parentheses are based on hospital site cluster-robust 
standard errors and in models including estimated residuals the standard errors are also bootstrapped (1,000 replications). 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
 
Panel a ŚĂƐƌĞƐƵůƚƐĨŽƌŚŝƉƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚ ?/ŶĂůůĨŽƵƌƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚɶŽŶƚŚĞ
Choice Policy*Market structure interaction implies that relaxation of constraints on choice had a 
larger positive effect on readmissions (i.e. negative effect on quality) on providers facing more pre-
2006 competition. Adding covariates (column (2) vs column (1)) reduces ɶ slightly and adding the 
first stage residuals increases it again, though it is not statistically significant for the linear 2SRI 
model (column (3)). The choice model residuals are jointly statistically significant for both the CL and 
linear specifications, indicating that there was endogenous selection, though this had only a 
ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŵŽĚĞƐƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐŽĨɶ ?12 
                                               
12 The 1st stage F-statistics of the instruments in the Linear 2SRI models are very large (Appendix Table A3). For the CL 2SRI, 
in the absence of a formal test, we find (Appendix Table A2) that the first stage conditional logit choice models have a very 
high goodness of fit. For example, Cragg and Uhler's R-Squared is over 0.989 in all years. 
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Panel b is for knee replacement and again all four specifications suggest that the relaxation of 
constraints on choice increased emergency readmissions. The effect is statistically significant in all 
cases and doubles with the CL 2SRI and Linear 2SRI models compared to the model (column (2)) 
which does not allow for endogenous selection. 
 
Panels c and d for CABG report generally small, negative and statistically insignificant effects of 
choice policy on emergency readmissions and on mortality for all four specifications in columns (1) 
to (4), whether or not we control for endogenous selection of hospitals. 
 
Given a pre-reform average equivalent number of rivals of 2.77, measured at orthopaedics specialty 
level, we estimate that the choice reform increased emergency readmissions by 0.57% ( hMJ ) for hip 
replacement, compared to the baseline risk of 5.72%, and by 0.30% for knee replacement patients, 
compared the baseline risk of 1.9%. With an estimated average £2,100 cost per 30 day readmission 
(Billings et al., 2012), this implies an increase in NHS costs by £32.3m for hip replacements and £13m 
for knee replacements for the period 2006/7-2010/11.13 
 
In Table 5 we examine if our results are sensitive to the way in which market structure is measured 
using the reciprocals of HHIs measured for all admission (1) to (3), for procedure (columns (4) to (6)), 
and using a simple count of rivals within 30km HHI (columns (7) to (9)). The pattern of results for each 
of these three market structure measures is very similar to that with the speciality-based measure in 
Table 4. The magnitude of the estimated ɶ coefficients on Choice Policy*Market Structure vary across 
the market structure measures but this is likely to be due to differences in the scale of this measure. 
As Table 1 shows, the mean pre-choice reform equivalent number of providers for musculoskeletal 
admissions is larger than for either hip or knee replacement admissions, smaller than the all planned 
admissions and much smaller than the simple count of rivals. This is the reverse of the rankings of the 
estimated ɶ coefficients across the market structure measures.14 
 
Since the choice of measure makes little substantive difference to our results we use market 
structure at specialty level in subsequent models as it seems more intuitive: the all-planned patients 
HHI combines very heterogeneous procedures, creating a risk of measurement error. Procedure-
level HHI might be more prone to endogeneity  W if some of the hospital characteristics included in 
the choice model used to estimate the predicted HHI (Appendix C) are correlated with hospital 
quality  W and to procedure-specific measurement error arising from large changes in HHIs due to 
temporary entry or exit of providers in the pre-policy period. The simple count of rivals ignores their 
size and distance from the hospital. 
 
6.3 Robustness checks 
Sample selection  
As we explained in section 4.4 we estimate the effect of the choice reform Table 6 on patients 
treated in NHS hospitals. To test if this creates sample selection bias, we include a Heckman 
selection correction in the second stage quality models, using the difference in distance between the 
                                               
13 These costs are estimated as: patients treated in period 2006/7-2010/11 ൈ (baseline risk + increased risk) ൈ cost of 
readmission within 30 days, which amounted to 244,372 ൈ (0.0572 + 0.0057) ൈ £2,100 for hip replacement and 280,723 ൈ 
(0.019 + 0.0030) ൈ £2,100 for knee replacement. 
14 We also estimated models using first principal component from a principal components analysis of HHIs based on all 
planned admissions, specialty admissions, procedure admissions and number of rival hospital sites within 30 km. The 
weights of the different market structure measures in the first principal component of the composite PCA-based market 
structure measure are given by the eigenvectors reported in Appendix Table A5a. It shows that all market structure 
measures are positively correlated with the first principal component, with larger and substantially equivalent weights to 
the all-planned admissions and planned specialty-level predicted HHIs. Results from the quality models using the first 
principal component as the measure of market structure were very similar to those from the model with speciality HHI 
(Appendix Table A5b). 
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nearest NHS and nearest private providers of care to NHS patients as an exclusion restriction in the 
first stage probit model for choosing a NHS hospital. Results are very similar to those in Table 4. The 
coefficient of the selection correction term is negative for hip replacement and positive for knee 
replacement, but never statistically significant,15 possibly because of extensive set of case-mix 
variables, hospital fixed-effects in the baseline specification, and the choice residuals in the two 
control function specifications. 
 
Post choice reform change in covariate effects 
It is possible that the effects of covariates on quality differed before and after the choice reform. The 
roll out of prospective pricing over the period could have led to changes in coding practice and there 
could be trends in age and gender specific readmission or mortality over our nine-year period. If so 
estimates of ÖJ  may be biased (Meyer, 1995). To allow for this we re-estimated the quality model 
adding an interaction between the post-choice indicator and the covariates (Abadie, 2005, p. 4).16 
The results are in the first three columns of Table 7. The pattern and magnitude of the estimated 
effect of the choice reform on quality are essentially unchanged. If anything, allowing covariate 
effects to differ pre and post the choice reform somewhat strengthens the results: ÖJ  increases in 
magnitude and is more precisely estimated for hip and knee replacements. There is little change in 
the CABG results. 
 
                                               
15 In the yearly first stage probit models for the choice of public versus private hospital, the marginal effects of the 
differential distance between the closest public and private hospital sites are always statistically significant at 1% level, and 
the p-values of the Chi-squared tests of the overall significance of the first stage probit regressions are also significant at 
1% level (Appendix Table A4).   
16 The Eq. (4) outcome model is replaced by 1 2 1 1iht t iht h t ht iht t ht t h it htq M A A AE J P H Hc c c c        x ȥ [ ȥ [ Ȝ [ Ȝ . 
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Table 5.  Effect of choice reform with alternative market structures 
  All admissions Predicted HHI Procedure-based Predicted HHI Number of rivals  
 
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
CL 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 2SRI 
residuals for 
all providers 
CL 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 
2SRI 
residuals  
CL 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
a. Hip Replacement Emergency Readmission (Patients: 412,464; hospital sites: 232)             
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0012* 0.0009 0.0013 0.0043** 0.0053* 0.0051** 0.0002** 0.0003* 0.0003** 
 (1.747) (0.904) (1.577) (2.262) (1.664) (2.276) (2.311) (1.947) (2.407)           
          
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0  641 491 
 648.76 513.21  650.5 539.1 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐ
coefficients=0  
0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012 
b. Knee Replacement Emergency Readmission (Patients: 461,594; hospital sites: 
238) 
            
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0004* 0.0007** 0.0008*** 0.0015** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0001* 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 
 (1.865) (2.015) (3.375) (2.492) (2.792) (4.379) (1.718) (2.856) (3.851)           
          
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0  766 554 
 768.10 564.71  7676.0 563.4 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐ
coefficients=0  
0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 
c. CABG Emergency Readmission (Patients: 112,844; hospital sites: 
47) 
              
Choice Policy * Market Structure -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (-0.384) (0.145) (-0.828) (0.119) (1.324) (-0.193) (-0.538) (-0.425) (-1.353)           
          
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0  247.2 75.48 
 253.30 76.22  254 77.57 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐ
coefficients=0  
0.0000 0.0053  0.0000 0.0045 
 
0.0000 0.0033 
R2 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
d. CABG Mortality (Patients: 114,291; hospital sites: 47)                 
Choice Policy * Market Structure -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0016 0.0007 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
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 (-0.101) (-0.211) (-0.535) (0.728) (1.125) (0.497) (0.479) (0.709) (0.038)           
          
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0  270 176 
 235.96 171.40  239.4 173.5 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐ
coefficients=0  
0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient in NHS provider had emergency readmission within 28 days from discharge following admission, or CABG patient in NHS provider died within 30 days. 
Choice Policy: indicator for 2006/7 onwards.  Market structure: average of estimated equivalent number of rival hospital sites (= 1/(predicted HHI)) from patient flows in year 2002/3 to 
2005/6. Market defined as: all planned patients (columns 1 to 3), all patients treated for the given planned procedure of admission (columns 4 to 6); the number of rivals within 30 km from 
the treating hospital. Columns (2), (5), (8) use residuals from linear first stage choice models. Columns (3), (6), (9) models add residuals conditional logit first stage choice model.  Financial 
years: 2002/3- 2010/11. t-statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped hospital site cluster-robust standard errors with 1,000 replications. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6. Effect of choice reform, allowing for selection into private providers 
  
FE model with 
covariates 
Linear 2SRI residuals 
for all providers 
CL 2SRI residuals 
for all providers 
  (1) (2) (3) 
a. Hip Replacement Emergency Readmission (Patients: 412,464; hospital sites: 232)   
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0018** 0.0020 0.0021** 
 (2.051) (1.539) (2.181) 
IMR (Inverse Mills Ratio) -0.0081 -0.0061 -0.0075 
 (-1.527) (-1.107) (-1.221)     
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0  650.0738 500.4340 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐс ?  0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.011 0.012 0.012 
b. Knee Replacement Emergency Readmission (Patients: 461,594; hospital sites: 238) 
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0005** 0.0011** 0.0011*** 
 (2.141) (2.386) (3.876) 
IMR (Inverse Mills Ratio) 0.0019 0.0023 0.0010 
 (0.756) (0.833) (0.334)    
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0  759.8586 549.3528 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐс ?  0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Notes. Dependent variable, Choice Policy and market structure defined as in Table 4. All models includes the IMR from 
a first stage probit regression of a dummy for patient treated by NHS hospital regressed on the differential distance 
between closest NHS and cůŽƐĞƐƚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐŝƚĞƐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶƌĞƐƚ ŝĐƚŝŽŶǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ?ƉůƵƐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ-mix 
covariates. The first stage probit sample includes NHS-funded planned hip and knee replacement patients treated in 
both NHS and Private providers. NHS + Private hip replacement sample: 436,950 patients in 279 hospital sites; NHS + 
Private knee replacement sample: 491,395 patients in 290 hospital sites.  
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Table 7. Robustness checks: change in effect of covariates post-policy; time-varying market structure; rival private hospitals 
    
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
CL 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
CL 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
CL 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
With post-policy interactions with 
covariates With time-varying market structure 
With controls for private hospitals 
within same area  
H
ip
 R
e
p
la
ce
m
e
n
t 
- 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
cy
 
R
e
a
d
m
is
si
o
n
s 
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0017* 0.0024* 0.0023** 0.0016** 0.0019 0.0019** 0.0017* 0.0017 0.0021** 
 (1.852) (1.683) (2.304) (2.004) (1.583) (2.137) (1.892) (1.282) (2.148) 
Market Structure    -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0009    
    (-0.128) (0.149) (-0.474)    
Any private hospital site within 30km       0.0001 0.0013 -0.0000 
       (0.335) (1.625) (-0.034) ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals coefficients=0  646.1812 505.5439  638.8924 496.8123  669.5321 498.5960 ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test Choice*covariates 
coefficients=0 65.9487 59.7571 63.6272       
R2 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012 
K
n
e
e
 R
e
p
la
ce
m
e
n
t 
- 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
cy
 R
e
a
d
m
is
si
o
n
s 
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0007** 0.0018*** 0.0013*** 0.0006** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0005* 0.0011** 0.0010*** 
 (2.409) (3.613) (3.812) (2.242) (2.757) (4.035) (1.860) (2.367) (3.444) 
Market Structure    -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0010    
    (-0.538) (-0.987) (-1.442)    
Any private hospital site within 30km       0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
       (0.452) (0.013) (0.675) ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals coefficients=0  773.8615 559.1953  764.9685 559.0726  778.0866 558.7277 ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test Choice*covariates 
coefficients=0 74.8075 83.9956 74.0259       
R2 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 
C
A
B
G
 -
 E
m
e
rg
e
n
cy
 
R
e
a
d
m
is
si
o
n
s 
Choice Policy * Market Structure -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0003 
 (-0.766) (-0.269) (-1.275) (0.103) (1.229) (-0.037) (-0.244) (0.768) (-0.525) 
Market Structure    -0.0008 -0.0031** -0.0014    
    (-0.811) (-2.388) (-1.197)    
Any private hospital site within 30km       -0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0007 
       (-0.417) (-0.933) (-0.850) ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals coefficients=0  254.6778 79.7451  258.5165 74.2910  242.3379 76.3224 
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ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test Choice*covariates 
coefficients=0 254.7389 248.4126 282.5588       
R2 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
C
A
B
G
 -
 M
o
rt
a
li
ty
 
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 
 (0.073) (0.151) (-0.317) (0.051) (-0.056) (-0.361) (-0.104) (0.028) (-0.518) 
Market Structure    0.0000 0.0004 0.0002    
    (0.045) (0.412) (0.226)    
Any private hospital site within 30km       -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0004 
       (-0.202) (-1.210) (-0.697) 
Choice Policy * pre-2006 N. of Private hospitals                     ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals coefficients=0  278.2191 160.0936  252.9012 179.7291  266.0324 177.0431 ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test Choice*covariates 
coefficients=0 190.9180 229.6857 187.6139       
R2 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Notes. Dependent variable, Choice Policy and market structure defined as in Table 4. Columns (1-3) include interaction terms of the choice policy dummy with all covariates to control for 
changes in the effect of case-mix. Columns (4-6) replace the time-invariant pre-policy market structure with the time-varying one. Columns (7-9) include a binary dummy for the 
presence of private hospitals in the same catchment area (30 km) where the hospital is located.   
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Time varying market structure 
In the middle three columns ((4), (5), (6)) of Table 7 we allow market structure to vary over time 
rather than being frozen to its pre 2006 value. This has little effect on the results, suggesting that 
market structure is not endogenous. 
 
Competition from private hospitals 
The HHIs on which the competition measure is based include private proǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚƐŚĂƌĞƐŽĨ
NHS patients. This treats NHS and private providers symmetrically and to allow for the possibility 
that NHS providers responded differently to competition from private providers, we added an 
indicator for there being at least one private hospital site within 30 km of the NHS provider. This also 
has little effect on the results, as shown in Table 7. 
 
The choice reform may have led to changes in other aspects of hospital behaviour, in addition to 
possible changes to our planned care quality measures. In particular it has been suggested that the 
reform led to reductions in length of stay (Cooper et al., 2018; Gaynor et al., 2013) for planned 
patients and in mortality for emergency patients (Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013; Moscelli 
et al., 2018b). We next investigate whether this has implications for our results for planned care 
quality. 
 
Patient length of stay 
The increase in emergency readmissions for planned hip and knee replacement patients might be 
ĚƵĞƚŽƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐďĞŝŶŐĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐĞĚ ‘quicker but sicker ? ?/ŶTable 8, we report models with length of 
stay as the outcome variable but with the same explanatories as our quality models. We find that 
length of stay for hip and knee replacement patients decreased more after 2006 in hospitals facing 
ŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞŝŶĚĞĞĚĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐĞĚ ‘ƋƵŝĐŬĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƐƚĐŚŽŝĐĞ
period. According to the estimates of the CL 2SRI specification, the effect is negative and significant 
at 5% (1%) level for knee (hip) replacement, and negative but not statistically significant for CABG 
patients. 
 
Table 8 also reports results for models for our quality measures including ƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶ-hospital 
length of stay as an additional covariate. Adding length of stay makes almost no difference to the 
estimates of ɶ compared with those in Table 5 (columns (1) to (3)). This implies that, although the 
choice policy reform affected readmissions for hip and knee replacements, the effect was direct 
rather than indirect via the effect of length of stay on readmissions and that our quality model is not 
biased by the omission of length of stay.17 
 
Hospital mortality 
Katz (2013) and Skellern (2017) suggests that hospital management might convey information about 
hospital quality through hospital mortality rates. If patients do not observe indicators for planned 
care quality this may induce a diversion of hospital efforts towards quality for emergency services, 
                                               
17 Ignoring covariates, time and provider fixed effects, and endogenous selection for simplicity, suppose that that length of 
stay sht is determined as 
s
iht s s h t ihts M AE J H   (i) and quality as qiht q q h t q iht ihtq M A sE J T H    (ii). Our baseline 
model Eq. (4) for quality omits length of stay so that ÖEJ = ɶq нɽq ɶs.  We find that whilst ÖsJ < 0, Ö 0qT | , and so ÖqJ is very 
similar to the estimates of ÖJ  in Table 4.  Since s and q are outcomes with welfare significance, estimation of the full 
structural model of q in (ii) is potentially of policy interest if there are policy tools available, in addition to competition, 
which could affect length of stay.  Optimal policy would then require also estimating a fuller version of (i) including the 
additional policy variables.  On the other hand, if s cannot be controlled other than through competition policy, we only 
need to estimate the full effect of competition policy ( ÖJ ) as our original quality model (Eq (4)). If s is of welfare relevance 
interest, then the finding from estimation of (i) that is affected by competition policy should be taken into account in an 
evaluation of the welfare effects of competition policy. 
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where mortality is high compared with planned care, generating adverse substitution or multi-
tasking effects. 
 
Table 8. Effect of choice reform allowing for in-hospital Length of Stay 
      
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 2SRI 
residuals for 
all providers 
CL 2SRI 
residuals for 
all providers 
Procedure Outcome 
variable 
Coefficients / statistics of interest 
(1) (2) (3) 
a. Hip 
Replacement 
Emergency 
Readmissions 
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0017** 0.0020 0.0021** 
 (2.019) (1.546) (2.150) 
Length of Stay in hospital 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.214) (0.371) (0.241) ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals coefficients=0  648.6297 498.7349 
p-value joint ʖ2 test residuals 
coefficients=0  0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.011 0.012 0.012 
Length of Stay 
in hospital 
Choice Policy * Market Structure -0.1777*** -0.1000 -0.1734*** 
 (-2.786) (-1.246) (-2.606) ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals coefficients=0  821.5415 698.4368 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals 
coefficients=0  0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.190 0.193 0.192 
b. Knee 
Replacement 
Emergency 
Readmissions 
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0006** 0.0011** 0.0011*** 
 (2.228) (2.402) (3.965) 
Length of Stay in hospital 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (4.680) (4.676) (4.690) ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals coefficients=0  773.9270 555.8283 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals 
coefficients=0  0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Length of Stay 
in hospital 
Choice Policy * Market Structure -0.1376** -0.0415 -0.1191** 
 (-2.326) (-0.542) (-2.029) ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals coefficients=0  714.6318 594.4042 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals 
coefficients=0  0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.167 0.169 0.169 
c. CABG 
Emergency 
Readmissions 
Choice Policy * Market Structure -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0005 
 (-0.441) (0.038) (-0.952) 
Length of Stay in hospital 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
 (3.788) (3.954) (3.810) ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals coefficients=0  264.4207 43.7128 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals 
coefficients=0  0.0000 0.6095 
R2 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Length of Stay 
in hospital 
Choice Policy * Market Structure -0.0295 -0.0842 -0.0578 
 (-0.350) (-0.773) (-0.477) ũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals coefficients=0  110.4490 66.3769 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ2 test residuals 
coefficients=0  0.0000 0.0327 
R2 0.128 0.130 0.129 
Notes. Dependent variable, Choice Policy and market structure defined as in Table 4. Model for emergency readmission as 
dependent variable includes here also length of in-hospital stay as covariate.
To check whether a diversion of hospital efforts to reduce mortality is confounding our results, we 
add standardised hospital mortality to the models. Results are in Table 9. The first six columns use 
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overall standardised mortality ratios  ?ƌ&ŽƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ,^DZ ?ĂƚŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůdƌƵƐƚůĞǀĞů.18 The last six columns 
include standardised mortality ratios for two emergency conditions in the same clinical specialty of 
the planned procedure performed, i.e. hip fracture for orthopaedics and AMI for circulatory disease. 
We also allow the effect of mortality to vary before and after the introduction of the patient choice 
reform (columns 4, 5, 6 and 10, 11, 12), to control for the possibility that within hospitals changes in 
clinical and organisational practices due to competition took off only after hospitals had an incentive 
to attract more patients from 2006 onwards. Regardless of the standardised mortality type and the 
presence or not of a pre/post-2006 break in the specifications, there is no substantive change in the 
estimates of ɶ in the first three columns of Table 5, suggesting that the diversion of efforts from 
planned to emergency care is unlikely to explain our findings. 
 
Mortality could affect interpretation of our results if it induces survivorship bias. In order to be 
readmitted within 30 days of discharge after their index planned procedure, patients must be alive. 
This implies that we have estimated our readmission models on a sample of patients who may be 
healthier than the population who have the planned procedure. We tested for this using a model for 
the effect of competition on emergency readmissions including a Heckman correction term for CABG 
patients ?ŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇ (survivorship bias is not a problem for hip and knee replacements, as shown by 
the mortality rates for these two procedures in Table 1) estimated from a first stage CABG mortality 
probit model. We find (Appendix Table A7) that the selection correction term is statistically 
insignificant and the effect of the choice reform on CABG readmission is still small and statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Finally, we used our specification (Eq. (4)) of the effect of choice on planned care quality to test for 
an effect of the choice reform on the quality of care for emergency AMI admissions. We find 
(Appendix Table A6) that, in line with Gaynor et al. (2013), the choice reforms reduced AMI 
mortality. This suggests that our findings of negative effects of the choice reform on quality for hip 
and knee replacements is not due to some inherent defect in our specification. 
 
6.4 Hospital profits on planned procedures 
The theory model sketched in Section 3, and the bulk of the theory literature, suggests that whether 
greater competition increases or reduces quality depends, inter alia, on whether marginal revenue is 
greater or smaller than marginal cost. Hospitals are paid a nationally fixed tariff Pjt per patient in 
HRGj in year t. Pjt is based on average reported costs for all hospitals in the two previous years with 
an adjustment for input prices in the area in which the hospital is located. It is therefore possible 
that, if costs increase over time, perhaps because of changes in medical technology or the morbidity 
of patients, changes in input prices, the HRG tariff could be less than the unit cost of the procedure, 
thus posing a financial risk to hospitals (Dixon, 2004). To check whether this is the case, we compute 
the per-treatment profit by procedure and by the largest volume HRG4 codes within procedures. 
 
The tariff for hospital h in year for HRG j is Pjt*MFFht. MFFht is the Market Forces Factor tariff 
adjustment for area input price variations, applied to hospital h in year t. In the absence of data on 
the marginal cost of HRGj in hospital h in year t we estimate it using information on average costs.
19  
Let ACjt denote the national unit cost for HRG j in financial year t; and CIht the reference cost index 
for all planned procedures in hospital h in year t. CIht compares the cost of hospital h ?Ɛ mix of outputs 
with the average national cost for the same mix. We assume that the average cost of HRG j in year t 
for hospital h is (CIht / 100)*ACjt. and so the per unit profit (ʋhjt) on HRG j in hospital h in year t is  
 
                                               
18 These figures were produced by Dr Foster, a data analytics and consulting company focused on the healthcare sector, 
and publicly available on http://www.brianjarman.com/ for all the years of our sample. 
19 We can justify this on the assumption that average cost is constant or that boundedly rational hospital management 
allocates effort to improve quality across procedures according to total rather than marginal profit. 
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ʋhjt = MFFht* Pjt  ? (CIht / 100)*ACjt     (14) 
 
Results are in Table 10. Over the two years (2009/10, 2010/11) for which we have data,20 NHS 
hospitals made an average loss for each patient of £750 for knee replacement, £485 for hip 
replacement and £370 for CABG. NHS hospitals sustained much larger losses on the procedures (hip 
and knee replacements) where we find a decrease in quality after the choice reform and had smaller 
losses for CABG patients where we found no effect of the choice reform on quality. Data limitations 
imply that our calculations are necessarily rough, but we think they are at least suggestive. 
 
                                               
20 Publicly available reference costs data for years 2006/7, 2007/8 and 2008/9 was reported used HRG4, while the national 
tariff for the same years was reported using HRG3.5, which makes difficult to compute hospital profit and losses by HRGs in 
those years.  
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Table 9. Effect of choice reform allowing for standardized mortality 
  
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 
2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
CL 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 
2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
CL 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 
2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
CL 2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
FE model 
with 
covariates 
Linear 
2SRI 
residuals 
for all 
providers 
CL 2SRI 
residuals for 
all providers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Std. Mortality at for all procedures (Dr Foster's HSMR) 
Std. Mortality of emergency condition within same specialty (hip fracture or 
AMI) 
a. Hip replacement emergency readmissions 
Choice Policy * Market 
Structure 0.0018** 0.0020 0.0021** 0.0017** 0.0018 0.0021** 0.0017** 0.0020 0.0021** 0.0017** 0.0021* 0.0021** 
 (2.046) (1.539) (2.153) (1.981) (1.444) (2.122) (2.014) (1.544) (2.145) (2.010) (1.654) (2.160) 
Std. Mortality 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 
 (0.769) (0.553) (0.514) (1.102) (0.782) (0.610) (0.321) (0.034) (0.095) (0.138) (-0.730) (-0.231) 
Choice Policy * Std. 
Mortality    -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001    0.0001 0.0005 0.0002 
        (-0.937) (-0.629) (-0.443)       (0.147) (1.131) (0.449) 
b. Knee replacement emergency readmissions 
Choice Policy * Market 
Structure 0.0006** 0.0011** 0.0011*** 0.0006** 0.0011** 0.0011*** 0.0005** 0.0010** 0.0011*** 0.0005** 0.0010** 0.0011*** 
 (2.245) (2.351) (3.942) (2.201) (2.397) (3.915) (2.148) (2.339) (3.862) (2.071) (2.259) (3.792) 
Std. Mortality 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002 0.0002* 0.0002 0.0002 
 (1.183) (1.131) (0.897) (0.933) (0.385) (0.750) (1.817) (1.772) (1.597) (1.647) (1.328) (1.387) 
Choice Policy * Std. 
Mortality    -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000    -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 
        (-0.103) (0.521) (-0.102)       (-0.535) (-0.114) (-0.321) 
c. CABG emergency readmissions 
Choice Policy * Market 
Structure -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0000 0.0009 0.0004 0.0000 0.0009 0.0004 
 (-0.381) (0.161) (-0.812) (-0.360) (0.200) (-0.816) (-0.019) (1.258) (0.521) (0.039) (1.239) (0.566) 
Std. Mortality 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.079) (-0.582) (-0.252) (-0.136) (-1.135) (-0.582) (-1.063) (-0.686) (-1.356) (-0.545) (-0.482) (-0.763) 
Choice Policy * Std. 
Mortality    0.0000 0.0002 0.0001    -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 
        (0.306) (1.093) (0.557)       (-0.328) (-0.035) (-0.328) 
d. CABG mortality 
Choice Policy * Market 
Structure 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 
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 (0.109) (-0.080) (-0.471) (0.070) (-0.092) (-0.445) (0.176) (0.342) (0.164) (0.121) (0.308) (0.144) 
Std. Mortality 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0003* 0.0003*** 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
 (1.925) (1.934) (2.163) (2.380) (1.864) (2.677) (1.193) (1.268) (0.760) (0.646) (0.751) (0.459) 
Choice Policy * Std. 
Mortality    -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001    0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
        (-1.168) (-0.568) (-1.205)       (0.466) (0.415) (0.303) 
Notes. Dependent variable, Choice Policy and market structure defined as in Table 4. Columns (1)-(6): adding standardized hospital mortality for all procedures as covariate; columns (7)-(12): 
adding standardized hospital mortality for emergency procedure within the same specialty (AMI mortality for CABG; hip fracture mortality for hip and knee replacement) as covariate. 
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Table 10. Profit and Loss analysis at procedure and HRG4 code level 
Year 
HRG 
code HRG Name 
Profit per patient 
(£) 
Patients HRG profit (£) HRG profit (£) 
per hospital 
site 
2009 
 
HB11C Major Hip Procedures for non Trauma Category 2 without CC -963 1,244 -1,198,088 -5,164 
HB12A Major Hip Procedures for non Trauma Category 1 with Major CC -2,247 2,372 -5,329,339 -22,971 
HB12B Major Hip Procedures for non Trauma Category 1 with CC -675 2,575 -1,739,358 -7,497 
HB12C Major Hip Procedures for non Trauma Category 1 without CC -240 41,947 -10,087,077 -43,479 
2010 
 
HB11C Major Hip Procedures for non Trauma Category 2 without CC 4 6,651 25,195 109 
HB12A Major Hip Procedures for non Trauma Category 1 with Major CC -2,202 2,132 -4,694,774 -20,236 
HB12B Major Hip Procedures for non Trauma Category 1 with CC -883 2,565 -2,263,682 -9,757 
HB12C Major Hip Procedures for non Trauma Category 1 without CC -586 35,230 -20,651,498 -89,015 
    TOTAL (over 2 years) -485 94,716 -45,938,620 -198,011 
2009 
 
HB21A Major Knee Procedures for non Trauma Category 2 with Major CC -316 3,052 -963,551 -4,049 
HB21B Major Knee Procedures for non Trauma Category 2 with CC -1,099 3,066 -3,369,046 -14,156 
HB21C Major Knee Procedures for non Trauma Category 2 without CC -1,475 47,983 -70,765,048 -297,332 
HB23C Intermediate Knee Procedures for non Trauma without CC 498 1,323 658,609 2,767 
2010 
 
HB21A Major Knee Procedures for non Trauma Category 2 with Major CC -522 3,298 -1,720,921 -7,231 
HB21B Major Knee Procedures for non Trauma Category 2 with CC 53 3,562 189,590 797 
HB21C Major Knee Procedures for non Trauma Category 2 without CC -117 46,250 -5,425,497 -22,796 
    TOTAL (over 2 years) -750 108,534 -81,395,863 -341,999 
2009 EA14Z Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (First Time) -831 8,227 -6,837,579 -145,480 
 EA16Z 
Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (First Time) with PCI, Pacing, EP or RFA +/- 
Catheter 
2,968 1,410 4,184,621 
89,034 
2010 EA14Z Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (First Time) -755 6,392 -4,827,282 -102,708 
 EA16Z 
Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (First Time) with PCI, Pacing, EP or RFA +/- 
Catheter 
328 2,210 725,259 
15,431 
    TOTAL (over 2 years) -370 18,239 -6,754,980 -143,723 
Notes. See section 6.4 for details of the computation of per patient profit. Last column based on 232 (238) hospitals sites for hip (knee) replacement and 47 sites for CABG.  
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7 Conclusions 
We have investigated whether the relaxation of constraints on patient choice in the English NHS in 
2006 changed the relationship between market structure and quality for three common planned 
treatments. We used two control function strategies to address possible bias induced by time 
varying self-selection into hospitals due to unobserved severity. For hip and knee replacements, the 
estimated effect of the 2006 choice reforms was a relatively small increase in the risk of emergency 
readmissions within 28 days of discharge. For knee replacement, the effect was always statistically 
significant but for hip replacement, the effect was statistically significant depending on the control 
function approach used. Given that it is significant using the CL 2SRI, which is likely to be more 
efficient (Newey and McFadden, 1994), we interpret this as evidence of the effect being significant 
also for hip replacement. The increase in the baseline risk of emergency readmissions for these two 
procedures implied an extra cost of about £45 million for the NHS in the period 2006-2010. The 
choice reform had no effect on emergency readmissions or mortality for CABG patients. Our results 
are robust to the measure of market structure, patient selection into NHS providers, allowing the 
effects of covariates to vary pre and post-choice reform, patient length of stay and hospital 
mortality. 
 
How can these results be rationalised and reconciled with existing evidence and theory? First, 
negative effects on quality have also been found in other empirical studies (see references in Section 
2.2). Second, they are compatible with theoretical models. For example, and in line with the model 
sketched in Section 3, Brekke et al. (2011, 2104) show that the effect of increased competition 
leading to increased demand responsiveness to quality depend on hospital preferences and cost 
functions. Quality could fall following an increase in competition if the regulated price is less than 
the cost of treating additional patients or if the marginal cost of treatment is greater when quality is 
higher. Our back-of-the-envelope hospital profit computations for years 2009 and 2010 suggest that 
treating planned hip and knee replacement was unprofitable for English hospitals, but less so for 
CABG patients. 
 
Third, our results for planned care quality are not incompatible with those from studies of 
emergency quality which use the same identification strategy but find improved quality for AMI 
(Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013) and hip fracture (Moscelli et al., 2018b). For example, if 
emergency mortality is seen as a signal of quality and influences demand, then patient choice could 
increase emergency quality and reduce planned care quality as the result of diverted effort (Katz, 
2013; Skellern, 2017). 
 
Fourth, our findings are also consistent with studies that find the demand elasticity to quality is 
generally low (about 0.1) and this is the case both for CABG (Gaynor et al., 2016) and hip 
replacement patients (Moscelli et al., 2016). This suggests that hospitals ? incentives to compete for 
planned patients is weak and may explain the relatively small effects of the choice reforms. 
 
Fifth, our findings are consistent with those of Gaynor et al. (2016). Their work evaluates the effect 
of the choice reform on CABG patients and they also present reduced-form evidence that the effect 
of choice, not competition, reduced patients mortality in the post-policy period. However, they find 
that the reduction in CABG mortality was significantly larger for patients not vising the nearest 
hospitals (Table 4, p. 3545) and that this reduction in mortality was negatively correlated with an 
increased elastic in demand with respect to mortality rate (Table 7, p. 3550). These results are 
compatible with a market in which the planned care hospital quality is constant or does not vary 
much, but patients are instead able to self-select into hospitals for CABG treatment that better 
match their healthcare needs, based on their severity, and so they can obtain better health 
outcomes. In this context, the reduction of patient mortality is due to a better matching between 
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patients and hospitals due to the official introduction of choice - not due to a positive effect of 
hospital competition. Indeed we find that hospital market structure had no significant effect on 
health outcomes for CABG patients. 
 
Moreover, our results are not due to (and are compatible with) competition improving efficiency, 
since our results hardly change once we control for length of stay. Neither are they due to cream 
skimming by private providers which open in the vicinity of NHS hospitals or to unobservedly less 
morbid patients being more likely to choose NHS hospitals. 
 
Overall, our findings contribute to the heated debate on the effect of competition on hospital quality 
(Bloom et al., 2011, 2012; Pollock, 2011a, 2011b) in two ways: we provide evidence that the English 
choice reforms had mixed effects on hospital quality for planned procedures, and we link our 
findings to a theory of hospital competition, shedding more light on ƚŚĞ ‘ďůack-ďŽǆ ?ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ
mechanism. 
 
However, the reductions in quality for knee and hip replacement procedures does not necessarily 
imply that patients undergoing these procedures were made worse off by the 2006 choice reform. 
Patients may place an intrinsic value on having a choice of provider (Dixon et al., 2010), or they could 
gain from being able to switch to previously unobtainable providers with lower mortality (Gaynor et 
al., 2016) or lower waiting times (Moscelli et al., 2018a). 
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Appendix A.  Additional results 
 
Figure A1. Volume of planned CABG, hip and knee replacement operations in NHS hospitals, financial years 
2002/03-2010/11 
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Figure A2. Trends in risk-adjusted standardized hospital quality measures 
Note: Data points plot from an OLS regression of the hospital quality measures (readmission or mortality rates) on years. 
Regression R2 provided in the graphs.  
 
 
Figure A3. Choice of hospital by distance from ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞ 
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Figure A4. Time trends in Competition Measures 
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Table A1.  Correlations amongst measures of market structure 
 Equiv. Num. of hospital sites within 30km   
   
All planned 
admissions 
Circulatory 
admissions 
Musculoskeletal 
admissions 
Hip 
Replacement 
admissions 
Knee 
Replacement 
admissions 
CABG 
admissions 
Equiv. Num. of hospital sites within 30km        
       Circulatory admissions 0.9707      
       Musculoskeletal admissions 0.9692 0.9544     
       Hip Replacement admissions 0.8495 0.8941 0.8568    
       Knee Replacement admissions 0.8891 0.9120 0.9043 0.9335   
       CABG admissions 0.8508 0.8814 0.8044 0.8745 0.7683  
Num. of NHS & ISP sites within 30km 0.7808 0.8551 0.7476 0.8939 0.7997 0.9020 
Notes.  Correlations are across sites and years. All correlations are significant at a p-value level of 1%. 
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Table A2. Goodness of Fit statistics of first stage Conditional Logit hospital choice model by procedure 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
a. Hip replacement sample 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.7133 0.6785 0.6583 0.6564 0.6571 0.6373 0.6186 0.6199 0.5711 
Cragg & Uhler's R-Squared 0.9966 0.9954 0.9946 0.9945 0.9945 0.9936 0.9925 0.9926 0.9889 
McFadden's adjusted R-Squared 0.7133 0.6784 0.6583 0.6563 0.6570 0.6372 0.6186 0.6198 0.5711 
b. Knee replacement sample 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.7201 0.6945 0.6612 0.6602 0.6731 0.6436 0.6215 0.6347 0.5825 
Cragg & Uhler's R-Squared 0.9968 0.9960 0.9947 0.9947 0.9952 0.9939 0.9927 0.9934 0.9899 
McFadden's adjusted R-Squared 0.7201 0.6945 0.6612 0.6602 0.6730 0.6436 0.6215 0.6347 0.5824 
c. CABG sample 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6483 0.6181 0.6397 0.6736 0.6792 0.6612 0.6927 0.6917 0.6927 
Cragg & Uhler's R-Squared 0.9902 0.9895 0.9902 0.9919 0.9923 0.9920 0.9936 0.9930 0.9930 
McFadden's adjusted R-Squared 0.6482 0.6179 0.6396 0.6735 0.6791 0.6610 0.6926 0.6915 0.6925 
 
 
 
 
Table A3. Average first stage F-stats for excluded instruments in linear choice model 
 Average 1
st stage F-stat Average adjusted R-squared 
Hip replacement 1280 0.1081 
Knee replacement 1381 0.1041 
CABG 1068 0.2293 
Note. The first column report the value of the average of 1st stage F-stat statistics computed from Eq. (6). Since the model in Eq. (6) is run for each hospital site and every year, the average is 
computed over the sample of number of years * hospital sites observations.   
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Table A4. Marginal effects of differential distance from first stage Probit model for selection into public 
hospital sites. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Hip replacement sample               
differential distance ISP - 
NHS -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0014*** -0.0028*** -0.0036*** -0.0027*** -0.0065*** 
 (-9.953) (-16.131) (-32.892) (-39.355) (-28.039) (-24.815) (-29.350)         
        
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.189 0.394 0.237 0.063 0.068 0.057 
Chi-squared 527.68 1185.10 5090.52 6385.81 1985.31 2482.99 2553.41 
Chi-squared p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BIC 4177.6 5108.3 7841.9 20583.9 29382.9 33938.6 42038.2 
Patients 43,879 44,526 48,120 53,980 54,580 54,609 56,067 
Knee replacement sample               
differential distance ISP - 
NHS -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0016*** -0.0028*** -0.0046*** -0.0039*** -0.0071*** 
 (-10.882) (-15.919) (-39.819) (-40.407) (-36.177) (-35.161) (-33.399)         
        
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.202 0.438 0.227 0.078 0.088 0.060 
Chi-squared 682.80 1373.03 6714.60 7320.11 2931.78 3890.22 3103.27 
Chi-squared p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BIC 6311.6 5440.1 8617.8 24993.4 34799.2 40536.1 48224.4 
Patients 48,519 50,854 54,504 62,885 63,275 63,551 64,172 
Notes. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if patient was treated in NHS hospital site, and equal to 0 if she was treated in a 
private site. The model includes controls for: age, gender, number of comorbidities and past emergency admissions, 
Charlson index, income and living enviroment deprivation at LSOA level, disability and incapacity claims at LSOA level. 
Given the scarcity of private hospital sites and patients treated into these before financial year 2004/05, the probit 
models could not be estimated in years 2002/03 and 2003/04. An Inverse Mills Ratio equal to zero was then included 
for patients in years 2002/03 and 2003/04 to estimate the main outcome equation reported in Table 6. 
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Table A5a. PCA Competition measure - Eigenvalues and eigenvectors 
  Principal component 
  1 2 3 4 
Hip replacement         
average of pre-2006 1/HHI "all planned admissions" 0.5255 -0.3017 -0.3387 -0.7198 
average of pre-2006 1/HHI "all planned muscoloskeletal 
admissions" 0.5227 -0.2659 -0.4218 0.6915 
average of pre-2006 1/HHI "all planned hip replacement 
admissions" 0.4659 0.8844 -0.0171 -0.0225 
average of pre-2006 number of rival hospital sites 0.4833 -0.2369 0.8409 0.0564 
     
Eigenvalue 3.3622 0.3454 0.2760 0.0164 
Knee replacement         
average of pre-2006 1/HHI "all planned admissions" 0.5260 -0.0994 -0.4618 -0.7072 
average of pre-2006 1/HHI "all planned muscoloskeletal 
admissions" 0.5259 0.0150 -0.4797 0.7022 
average of pre-2006 1/HHI "all planned knee replacement 
admissions" 0.4698 0.7528 0.4577 -0.0552 
average of pre-2006 number of rival hospital sites 0.4755 -0.6505 0.5892 0.0603 
     
Eigenvalue 3.3914 0.3555 0.2384 0.0147 
CABG         
average of pre-2006 1/HHI "all planned admissions" 0.5156 -0.0373 -0.5527 -0.6536 
average of pre-2006 1/HHI "all planned circulatory admissions" 0.5155 -0.2612 -0.3648 0.7301 
average of pre-2006 1/HHI "all planned CABG admissions" 0.4729 0.8334 0.2685 0.0984 
average of pre-2006 number of rival hospital sites 0.4947 -0.4857 0.6995 -0.1735 
     
Eigenvalue 3.6316 0.2596 0.1016 0.0071 
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Table A5b.  Effect of choice reform on planned quality with PCA market structure measure 
  PCA proxy Predicted HHI 
 FE model with 
covariates 
Linear 2SRI residuals 
for all providers 
CL 2SRI residuals 
for all providers 
  (1) (2) (3) 
a. Hip Replacement Emergency Readmission (Patients: 412,464; hospital sites: 232) 
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0018** 0.0022 0.0023** 
 (2.168) (1.590) (2.240)     
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0  644.3655 512.0634 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐ
coefficients=0 
 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.011 0.012 0.012 
b. Knee Replacement Emergency Readmission (Patients: 461,594; hospital sites: 238) 
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0006** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
 (2.147) (2.681) (4.170)     
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0  769.2175 562.5360 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐ
coefficients=0 
 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.003 0.004 0.004 
c. CABG Emergency Readmission (Patients: 112,844; hospital sites: 47)   
Choice Policy * Market Structure -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0007 
 (-0.340) (0.326) (-0.908)     
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0  250.7090 76.6179 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐ
coefficients=0 
 0.0000 0.0041 
R2 0.003 0.004 0.003 
d. CABG Mortality (Patients: 114,291; hospital sites: 47)     
Choice Policy * Market Structure 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0002 
 (0.247) (0.300) (-0.215)     
joint Chi^2 test residuals coefficients=0  255.9031 175.1718 
p-ǀĂůƵĞũŽŝŶƚʖ ?ƚĞƐƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐ
coefficients=0 
 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient in NHS provider had emergency readmission within 28 days from discharge following 
admission, or CABG patient in NHS provider died within 30 days. Choice Policy: indicator for 2006/7 onwards.  Market 
structure: first principal component from PCA model using HHIs for all planned, speciality, procedure, number of rival 
providers. Column (2) models use residuals from linear first stage choice models. Columns (3) models add residuals from 
conditional logit first stage choice model. Financial years: 2002/3- 2010/11. t-statistics in parentheses, based on 
bootstrapped hospital site cluster-robust standard errors with 1,000 replications. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
Table A6. Effect of choice policy on AMI mortality 
 
AMI 
Market structure measure: Equivalent number of rival sites 30km 
Choice policy*Frozen Market 
Structure   -0.0028** 
 (-2.2936) 
  
Patients 288287 
Sites 238 
Notes. Market structure is fixed at the average level in the pre-policy period for each hospital site. Equivalent number of 
rival sites 30km = 1/(predicted HHI), based on all planned admissions to hospital. Model has same covariates as text 
models of planned quality. 
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Table A7. Marginal effect of competition on CABG emergency readmissions controlling for selection due to 
CABG mortality with Heckman selection model 
  CABG Emergency Readmissions 
Choice Policy * Market Structure -0.0001 
 (-0.3519) 
IMR (Inverse Mills Ratio) -0.2692 
 [-0.7845; 0.4650]   
  
Patients 114289 
Hospital Sites 47 
Number of censored patients 1447 
Notes. Market structure is fixed at the average level in the pre-policy period for each hospital site. The model is estimated 
wih the inclusion of a Heckman selection correction term from a first stage probit model with dependent variable being 
a dummy for the patient surviving for at least 30 days after discharge from the index CABG surgery.    
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Appendix B.  Procedure and speciality definitions 
Hip replacement admissions are those with  
(i) a first OPCS procedure code: W371, W381, W391, W931, W941, W951,  W378, W379, W388, W389, 
W398, W399, W938, W939, W948, W949, W958, W959;  (ii) W581 as the 1st procedure and Z843 in 
2nd to 4th  procedure fields.  
 
Knee replacement admissions are those with  
(i) a first OPCS procedure code W401, W411, W421,  W408, W408, W418, W419, W428, W429; (ii) 
W581 as the 1st procedure  and Z846 in 2nd to 4th  procedure fields.  
 
CABG admissions are those with 
(i) a first OPCS procedure code K40, K41, K42, K43, K44, K45, K46 excluding patients simultaneously 
undergoing a heart valve replacement (any procedure being coded from K23 to K38) or a dominant 
angioplasty (PTCA) operation (in the first procedure coded as K751, K752, K753, K754, K758, K759, 
K49, K501, K504, K508, K509).     
 
Circulatory admissions are those with a main ICD10 diagnostic code starting with I (diseases of the 
circulatory system) or main procedure OPCS code starting with K or L (heart, arteries and veins 
procedures). Musculoskeletal admissions are those with main ICD10 diagnostic code starting with M 
(diseases of the musculoskeletal system) main procedure OPCS code starting with V or W (bones and 
joints procedures). 
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Appendix C. Measurement of market structure 
Market structure: predicted equivalent number of sites 
Our main market structure measure is based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): the sum of the 
square of provider market shares. For a market with N firms it varies between 1 (monopoly) and 1/N. 
The HHI for patients in LSOA j is the sum of the squared shares of their planned admissions at the 
providers they use.  It is a measure of the amount of choice they have amongst planned care providers. 
We compute the HHI for site h as a weighted average of the HHIs for patients in LSOAs within 30 km 
of site h: 
 
   2h j hj jhjj hj hHHI HH s ss I ª º u  u« »¬ ¼¦ ¦¦     (C1) 
 
where ũс ? ? ? ?: indexes English LSOAs, sjh is the proportion of patients from LSOA j treated at a site h 
within 30km of their LSOA, and  shj is the proportion of site h patients from LSOA j within 30km of site 
h.   
 
To remove possible bias arising from the effect of quality on utilisation we compute predicted HHIs 
derived from models of patient choice of provider (NHS and private sites) for planned care in which 
choice is not allowed to depend on quality (Kessler and McClellan, 2000). We estimate Poisson choice 
models with the number of planned patients from LSOA j choosing provider h in year t having 
conditional mean  
 
  ^ `2 21 2 1 2| , , exp X Xjht j jh ht jt t jh t jh ht t jh ht t jh ht tn d X d d X d X d X[ [ O O O O O(        (C2) 
 
where djh is the distance from the centroid of LSOA j to hospital site h within 30km.  Xht is a vector of 
dummies for hospital characteristics (belonging to a Foundation Trust, belonging to a teaching Trust). 
NHS Foundation Trusts have more discretion in paying staff, using surpluses, do not have to break 
even each year and can borrow from the capital market (Marini et al., 2008).  Foundation Trusts status 
was introduced in 2004 and by 2010 60% of NHS Trusts were Foundation Trusts. About 20% of NHS 
hospitals have Teaching status, undertaking additional activities including teaching and research, and 
treating more complex patients. 
 
,^ĚĞĨŝŶĞƐƉůĂŶŶĞĚĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐĂƐƚŚŽƐĞ “ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĂĚŵŝƚĐŽƵůĚďĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŝŵĞ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?tĞĞǆĐůƵĚĞƉůĂŶŶĞĚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐǁŚŽƐĞĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞƉĂƌƚŽĨĂƉůĂŶŶĞĚ
course of treatment (for example, patients on dialysis, or cancer patients on chemotherapy). 
 
The Poisson model yields the same estimated coefficients as the conditional logit model (Guimaraes 
et al., 2003) but is quicker to estimate. Models interacting patient characteristics with hospital site 
characteristics yielded very similar predicted patient flows. 
 
The predicted Ö jhtn from Eq. (C2) are used to compute the predicted shares Ö jhts Ö Ö/jht jhthn n ¦  and 
Öhjts Ö Ö/jht jhtjn n ¦ , and used in eq. (C2), instead of the actual flows, to compute the predicted HHI 
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indices. Since the reciprocal of the HHI is the number of equal sized firms, which would yield the HHI, 
we use the reciprocal of the predicted HHI as the measure of competition facing a provider. 
 
 
